When banks choose similar investment strategies the nancial system becomes vulnerable to common shocks. We model a simplenancial system in which banks decide about their investment strategy based on a private belief about the state of the world and a social belief formed from observing the actions of peers. Observing a larger group of peers conveys more information and thus leads to a stronger social belief. Extending the standard model of Bayesian updating in social networks, we show that the probability that banks synchronize their investment strategy on a state non-matching action critically depends on the weighting between private and social belief. This eect is alleviated when banks choose their peers endogenously in a network formation process, internalizing the externalities arising from social learning.
Introduction
When a large number of nancial intermediaries choose the same investment strategy (i.e. their portfolios are very similar) the nancial system as a whole becomes vulnerable to common shocks. A case at hand is thenancial crisis of 2007/2008 when many banks invested into mortgage backed securities in anticipation that the underlying mortgagesmany of which being US subprime mortgageswould not simultaneously depreciate in value.
This assumption turned out to be incorrect resulting in one of the largest nancial crises since the great depression. How could so many banks choose a non-optimal investment strategy despite the fact that they carefully monitor both economic fundamentals and the actions of other banks?
This paper presents a simple agent-based model in which nancial intermediaries synchronize their investment strategy on a state non-matching action despite informative private signals about the state of the world. In a countable number of time-steps N agents, representing nancial intermediaries (banks for short), choose one of two actions. There are two states of the world which are revealed at the end of the simulation. A bank's action is either state-matching, in which case the bank receives a positive payo if the state is revealed, or it is state-non-matching in which case the bank receives zero. Banks are connected to a set of peers in a nancial network of mutual lines of credit resembling the interbank market. They receive a private signal about the state of the world and observe the previous actions of banks with whom they are connected via a mutual line of credit, but not of other banks. Based on both signals banks form a belief about the state of the world and choose their action accordingly.
Our model diers from the existing literature along two dimensions. First and foremost we develop an agent-based model of the nancial system with strategic interaction amongst agents. This diers from existing models (see ,   3 for example, Poledna et al. (2014) , Bluhm et al. (2013) , Georg (2013) , and Ladley (2013) ) where agent behaviour is myopic. Agents in myopic models react to the state of the world but when choosing an optimal action they do not take into account how other agents will react to their choice. Thus, the notion of equilibrium in myopic models is a rather mechanical. Strategic interaction amongst agents arises in our model from the fact that agents learn about their neighbors' actions, i.e. via the social belief. All the aforementioned papers furthermore use an exogenous network structure as starting point for the agent-based simulation, while our model uses an endogenous network formation process to arrive at a pairwise stable network structure that maximizes expected utility from social learning.
Second, while our model is mildly boundedly rational it shares a number of assumptions with the literature on Bayesian learning in social networks. The main dierence to this literature (see, for example, Acemoglu et al. (2011) , Gale and Kariv (2003) ) is that we model an externality that is not present in the standard model of Bayesian learning in social networks. We assume that banks receive more information about the actions of other banks than they can computationally use. This assumption seems natural in a nancial system that is increasingly complex.
1 The underlying assumption is that banks cannot adjust their actions (i.e. their investment strategy) as fast as they receive information from their peers and thus have to aggregate over potentially large amounts of information.
2 The social belief in our model is formed not just from observing one neighbor at a time, but rather from observing a set of neighbors simultaneously. It is thus reasonable to assume that receipt of more information, i.e. observing the actions of a larger subset of agents, will create a stronger social belief than the receipt of less information. We model this by allowing for dierent weights of the social and private belief.
The other key dierence to the existing literature on Bayesian learning in social networks is that we allow agents to endogenously form links based on the utility they get from an improved social belief in a rst stage of the model. In the second stage of the model agents then learn about the state of the world and take their investment decisions. To the best of our knowledge, the only other paper considering endogenously formed social networks in a Bayesian learning setup is Acemoglu et al. (2014) who develop a two-stage game similar to ours. Acemoglu et al. (2014) model endogenous network formation via a communication cost matrix where some agents (in a social clique) can communicate at low costs, while others communicate at high cost. The main dierence to our model is that we endogenously obtain a decreasing marginal value of additional links. We obtain a resulting endogenous network structure which is pairwise stable in the sense of Jackson and Wolinsky (1996) .
We obtain two sets of results, one for networks with exogenous network structure, and one for endogenously formed networks. First, we analyze different ways of weighting private and social belief. In particular, we compare the standard equal weighting scenario in which agents place equal weights on their private and social belief, with two scenarios where agents place more weight on the social belief when they have a larger neighborhood. In the neighborhood size scenario the social belief is weighted with the size of the neighborhood, i.e. the private signal is weighted equal to every observed neighbor action. In the relative neighborhood scenario agents put more weight on the social belief when the neighborhood constitutes a larger share of the overall network. For completely uninformative signals there is no dierence between these weighting functions. For informative signals, however, the weighting function has an impact on the probability that agents synchronize their investment decisions on a state non-matching ac-5 tion, i.e. for the probability that choosing a state-non-matching action is contagious.
3 Contagion is, very generally, understood as the transmission of adverse eects from one agent to another and is more likely if agents place greater weight on their social belief and depends on the density of the underlying exogenous network structure.
4 The probability of contagion increases by a factor of 200 in the neighborhood size scenario compared to the equal weighting scenario, which highlights the importance of understanding the learning dynamics when agents place dierent weight on their social belief, depending on the size of their neighborhood.
We show that contagious synchronization occurs even if private signals are informative and if agents are initialized with an action that is on average state matching. The probability of contagion depends non-monotonously on the density of the network. For small network densities ρ 0.1 the probability of contagion increases sharply and then decreases slowly for larger network densities. We conrm the robustness of our results by conducting 2, 000 independent simulations where we observe the average nal action as a function of the average initial action with varying network densities.
This result is of particular interest for policy makers as it relates two sources of systemic risk: common shocks and interbank market freezes. When the network density is too small, for example in the aftermath of an interbank market freeze, banks are unable to fully incorporate the information about their peers' actions. This eect is empirically tested by Caballero (2012) , who documents a higher correlation amongst various asset classes in the world in the aftermath of the Lehman insolvency, i.e. during times of extreme stress on interbank markets and heightened uncertainty about the state of the world. This can be understood as a contagious synchronization 3 Such informational cascades are a well-documented empirical phenomenon. See, for example, Alevy et al. (2007) , Bernhardt et al. (2006) , Chang et al. (2000) , Chiang and Zheng (2010) , and Cipriani and Guarino (2014) . 4 For a more thorough discussion of the dierent forms of contagion, see for example Bandt et al. (2009) . 6 of bank's investment strategies for which our model provides a simple rationale.
Second, turning to the extension of endogenously formed networks, we show that endogenous link formation in the rst stage of our model can significantly improve the speed of learning and reduce the probability of contagious synchronization relative to random networks. When private signals are less informative, the additional utility from forming a link is smaller and the endogenously formed network is less dense. This in turn can increase the probability of contagious synchronization in the second stage of the model.
Heightened uncertainty about the state of the world, i.e. a less informative signal, does therefore not only directly increase the probability of contagious synchronization, but also indirectly because agents have less incentives to endogenously form links. If agents are heterogenous in the informativeness of their private signals, i.e. if some agents receive signals with higher precision than others, we show that the resulting endogenous network structure is of a core-periphery type. The structure of real-world interbank markets is often of this particular type, as for example Craig and von Peter (2014) show. Naturally, these endogenously formed networks transfer information more eectively from highly informed agents to less informed agents than simple random networks. This paper relates to three strands of literatures. First and foremost, the paper develops a nancial multi-agent simulation in which agents learn not only from private signals, but also via endogenously formed interbank links. This is in contrast with existing multi-agent models of the nancial system which include Nier et al. (2007) and Iori et al. (2006) who take a xed network and static balance sheet structure.
5 Slight deviations from these 5 Closely related is the literature on nancial networks. See, for example, Allen and Gale (2000) , and Freixas et al. (2000) for an early model of nancial networks. The vast majority of models in this literature consider a xed network structure only (see, amongst various others, Battiston et al. (2012) ). 7 models can be found, for example, in Bluhm et al. (2013) , Ladley (2013), and Georg (2013) who employ dierent equilibrium concepts. The main contribution this paper makes is to develop a suciently simple model of a nancial system with a clear notion of equilibrium that allows to be implemented on a computer and tested against analytically tractable special cases.
Second, this paper relates to the literature on endogenous network formation pioneered by Jackson and Wolinsky (1996) and Bala and Goyal (2000) .
Few papers on endogenous network formation in interbank markets, exist, however. Notable exceptions are Castiglionesi and Navarro (2007) who study the formation of endogenous networks in a banking network with microfounded banking behaviour. Unlike Castiglionesi and Navarro (2007) , however, our paper uses a starkly simplied model of social learning to describe the behaviour of banks. This allows the introduction of informational spillovers from one bank to another, a mechanism not present in the work of Castiglionesi and Navarro (2007) .
Finally, our paper is closely related to the literature on Bayesian learning in social networks. The paper closest to ours in this literature is Acemoglu et al. (2014) who study a model of sequential learning in an endogenously formed social network where each agent receives a private signal about the state of the world and observe past actions of their neighbors. We contribute to this literature by allowing agents to place more weight on their social belief when their neighborhood is larger. Other related papers in this literature include Banerjee (1992) , Bikhchandani et al. (1992) , Bala and Goyal (1998) , and Gale and Kariv (2003) Taking an action and switching between actions is costless. The utility of bank i from investing is given as:
The state of the world is unknown ex-ante and revealed at time T . This setup captures a situation where the state of the world is revealed less often (e.g. quarterly) than banks take investment decisions (e.g. daily).
6
6 In an alternative setup the state of the world is xed throughout and an agent collects information and takes an irreversible decision at time t, but receives a payo that is discounted by a factor e −κt . Both formulations incentivize agents to take a decision in nite time instead of collecting information until all uncertainty is eliminated.
connections called neighbors. This implements the notion of a network of banks g which is dened as the set of banks together with a set of unordered In this section, the network g is exogenously xed throughout the simulation. In t = 0 there is no previous decision of agents. Thus, each bank decides on its action in autarky. Banks receive a signal about the state of the world and form a private belief upon which they decide about their investment strategy x i t=0 . The private signal received at time t is denoted s i t ∈ S where S is a Euclidean space. Signals are independently generated according to a probability measure F θ that depends on the state of the world θ. The signal structure of the model is thus given by (F 0 , F 1 ). I assume that 
The set of all possible information sets of bank i is denoted by I i . A strategy for bank i selects an action for each possible information set. Formally, a strategy for bank i is a mapping σ i :
n } is used to denote the strategies of all banks other than i.
A strategy prole σ = {σ i } i∈1,...,n is a pure strategy equilibrium of this game of social learning for a bank i's investment, if σ i maximizes the bank's expected pay-o, given the strategies of all other banks σ −i . Acemoglu et al. 7 In practice this is ensured by having many more update steps than it takes the system to reach a steady state.
11 (2011) show that the strategy decision of bank i,
) is given as:
and x i ∈ {0, 1} otherwise. The rst term on the right-hand side of Equation   3 is the private belief, the second term is the social belief, and the threshold is xed to 1 2 . This equation can be generalized when introducing weights on the private and social belief. In its most general form, it can be written as:
where t(p i , q i ) is a weighting function depending on the private and social belief. A simple weighting function 
And (ii) Observed actions are weighted with the relative size of the neighborhood (called the relative neighborhood scenario):
The private belief of bank i is denoted p i = P(θ = 1|s i ) and can easily be obtained using Bayes' rule. It is given as:
where f 0 and f 1 are the densities of F 0 and F 1 respectively. Bank i is assumed to form a social belief q i by simply averaging over the actions of all neighbors j ∈ K i t−1 :
Given these private and social beliefs, agents choose an action according to equation (4).
Averaging over the actions of neighbors is a special case of DeGroot (1974) who introduces a model where a population of N agents is endowed with initial opinions p(0). Agents are connected to each other but with varying 13 levels of trust, i.e. their interconnectedness is captured in a weighted directed n × n matrix T . A vector of beliefs p is updated such that p(t) = T p(t − 1) = T t p(0). DeMarzo et al. (2003) point out that this process is a boundedly rational approximation of a much more complicated inference problem where agents keep track of each bit of information to avoid a persuasion bias (eectively double-counting the same piece of information).
Therefore, the model this paper develops is also boundedly rational. i given by Equation (2). Agents receive utility (1) and decide on their optimal strategy given in Equation (3). The interaction of agents is captured in a network structure g, encapsulated in an agent i's information set. Equations (8) and (9) specify how agents take their decisions and choose an optimal strategy.
Herding with Exogenous Network Structures
Our interest is to understand under which conditions agents in the model with an exogenously xed network structure coordinate on a state nonmatching action. Before analyzing the full model, we build some intuition by discussing useful benchmark cases. Let the state of the world be θ = 0 and assume that f 0 = mf 1 . For m = 1 the signal is completely uninformative.
For m > 1 the signal is informative and more so the larger m is. In the equal weighting scenario, equation (3) together with equations (8) and (9) 1 2 (1 + m)
For completely uninformative signals, m = 1, equation (10) (10) for this scenario reads:
For completely uninformative signals m = 1 this condition reduces to the equal weighting scenario. For highly informative signals, m 1, however, the agent is almost as willing to follow her neighbors as in the uninformative equal weighting scenario. The neighborhood scenario thus captures the situation where the agent is aware not only of her own private signal informativeness, but also of that of her neighbors. In the relative neighborhood scenario equation (10) reads: We can gain further insights into the model dynamics by resorting to a mean-eld approximation in which we consider the simplied action dynamics of a representative agent. Given the adjacency matrix g of a network g, the social belief q of the representative agent is given as q = gx/k where x is the vector of all agent's actions. The social belief in the mean-eld approximation is simply the average action of the population:
which yields a self-consistency relation for the social belief and hence for the average action of the population. The equilibrium average action q * is implicitely given by the solution to the self-consistency condition:
Note that Pr(x = 1 | q = 0) = 0 and Pr(x = 1 | q = 1) = 1. Since
Pr(x = 1 | q = q * ) is the cumulative distribution function of the bell shaped private belief it will have a sigmoid shape. Therefore the self consistency equation will have three solutions: q 1 = 0, q 2 = 1 and some q 3 ∈ (0, 1). We illustrate this in gure 4. q 1 , q 2 are stable xed points while q 3 is unstable (this can be seen graphically in gure 4 and is a direct result from the specied learning dynamics). q 3 denes the critical social belief beyond which the system synchronizes on the state non-matching action. In both cases we use a standard deviation of σ 0,1 = √ 0.1. we assume that the state of the world is θ = 0. An overview of the parameters used can be found in Table 1 . 
Contagious Synchronization in Endogenously Formed Networks
Banks form interbank networks endogenously. The decision whether or not two banks engage in interbank lending, e.g. in the form of agreeing on a mutual line of credit, depends in reality on many factors, including liquidity needs and counterparty risk. In the previous section we analyzed how one bank can learn about an underlying state of the world by observing the action of another bank to which it has issued an interbank credit. This additional information can create a benet for the loan-issuing bank that constitutes a, possibly positive, externality for the lending decision. When banks coordinate on a state non-matching information, however, learning about a neighboring bank's action constitutes a negative externality. The net eect of both externalities determines whether two banks are willing to engage in interbank lending. We compute the value of an additional link in three steps. First, we compute the probability that an agent chooses a state matching action, given her signal structure, private beliefs and neighbors' actions. Given this probability, we compute, second, an agent's expected utility conditional on her social belief which depends on her strategic choice to establish a link. Once an agent's expected utility with and without a link is computed, we can use the concept of pairwise stable networks to determine the equilibrium network structure.
The Probability that Agents Choose a State Matching Action
Based on the signal structure, the update of private beliefs, and neighbors' action choice we can derive the probability that an agent i chooses a state matching action. To see this, we rst derive the distribution of private beliefs. The private signal structure is given as:
and we assume that σ 0 = σ 1 = σ. Denote the probability distribution of agent i's private belief p i as f p (p i ). We can then state the following:
Proposition 1 For θ ∈ {0, 1} the probability that agent i chooses a state matching action x i = θ, given a social belief q i = q and private belief p i , is
given by:
where the distribution f p (p i | θ = 0) of agent i's private belief is given as:
and similarly for f p (p
Proof, see Appendix (C).
In the absence of maturity, liquidity and counterparty risk, the value of an interbank loan, is proportional to the probability that the newly connected neighbor chooses a state-matching action and thus proportional to (18).
Agents' Expected Utility
Recall that an agent i's utility u i is given as:
The expected utility of agent i conditional on her social belief q i is thus:
The value of a link is given by the marginal utility from establishing a link, which in turn depends on the change in the social belief q. An agent can thus inuence her social belief by strategically choosing neighbors. The probability that a neighbor takes a state matching action depends in turn on the social belief that this neighbor forms about her neighbors, which leads to complex higher-order eects which we neglect in this paper. Rather, we assume that an agent i has constant beliefs about her neighbors' social beliefs q . An agent who ignores the eect of second-nearest neighbors (i.e.
neighbors of neighbors) on the social beliefs of nearest neighbors will simply assume that her neigbhors' social belief is q = 1 2 . This amounts to assuming 21 that the neighbors' actions are independent of each other. The expected utility of agent i conditional on a given q and neighborhood K i is given as:
where Q i is the set of all possible values of the social belief of agent i. The rst term on the right-hand side of equation (22) is the probability that agent i has a certain social belief given the social belief of her neighbors.
The second term is the probability of choosing a state matching action given that social belief and given by equation (18). For a given size of the agent's 
i.e. X ai is the set of all action vectors that are compatible with a social belief q i = a. Then the probability of agent i having a private belief of q i = a given the social beliefs of all i's neighbors, q , is given as:
Now dene the probability that neighbor j chooses a state matching action as:
Note, that f p (p j | θ = 0) depends on the signal structure of neighbor j.
We can write for the probability of agent i having a private belief of q i = a 22 in equation (24):
If z j = z ∀j the distribution in 24 would be a simple binomial distribution.
In general, however, this is not the case and we need to resort to numerical methods to compute the equilibrium network structures.
The Network Formation Process
We now have all necessary ingredients to compute the expected utility of an agent i given her neighborhood K i and expectations about her neighbors' social belief q . In the endogenous network formation process the agent will seek to maximize her utility by changing her neighborhood while holding q xed. In this section we outline an algorithm for endogenous network formation that ensures a pairwise stable network in the sense of Jackson 
(ii) For all banks i and j not directly connected by a link,
where the notation g + l ij denotes the network g with the added link l ij and g − l ij the network with the link l ij removed. When maintaining a link is costly, there will be some network density that depends on the cost c > 0 per link. The marginal utility of an additional link decreases with the number of links because the expected utility is bounded by 1 (the pay-o is 1 and the probability of choosing the correct action is less than, or equal to, 1).
The algorithm to ensure a pairwise stable equilibrium starts by choosing a random agent i from the set of agents N . Then, choose a second agent j from the set of agents N \ K i that are not yet neighbors of i. Agents are chosen with the following probability:
where Z = k w k is a normalization constant and
for agent j's signal strength. For β = 0 i chooses the new agent with equal probability. While this makes it more likely that agent i considers forming a link with agent j when j has a higher signal strength, it does not imply that such a link is actually formed. This decision is solely based on the utility that both i and j obtain from establishing the link.
e. the neigborhood of agent i after adding adding agent j, and similarly K j = K j ∪ i. The marginal utilities of adding j and i to the respective neighborhoods are then:
Given the marginal utilities of agents i and j and their cost of maintaining link c i and c j the agents will form a link if ∆ū
the algorithm selects the least informative agent in the neighborhood of j:
Now, dene
j , form the link l ij and remove the link l jk (and similarly for i → j and
j repeat the previous step, i.e. consider removing the least informative neighbor and re-evaluate the utilities.
Equilibrium Networks
The endogenously formed network in an economy with identically informed agents and positive cost c of maintaining a link is a simple Erdös-Rényi network with a network density depending on the signal structure and link cost. To analyze more realistic situations, we can harvest the strengths of multi-agent simulations. In the following we therefore assume that agents are heterogenously informed about the underlying state of the world: a few informed agents have relatively precise signals and low costs of maintaining a link, while many uninformed agents have relatively imprecise signals and higher cost of maintaining a link. Table 2 summarizes the parameters we are using for the rest of this section.
In order to compare the dynamics on the endogenous networks to the ER networks we run the following simulations. We rst create 1, 000 networks using the network formation algorithm described above. Then, we run the social learning algorithm described in Section 2 while holding the network structure constant throughout. The underlying assumption is that banks are updating their investment decisions faster than the network structure changes. This can be empirically corroborated by looking at the term structure of interbank lending. While 90% of the turnover in interbank markets is overnight, about 90% of exposures between banks stems from the term segments.
We also run the social learning algorithm with an initialization bias in which we set the initial action of all agents to some pre-dened value. To assess the eciency of the endogenous network formation, we compare the performance of the endogenously formed networks to the performance of Erdös-Rényi networks. All simulations in this section are conducted using the equal weighting scenario. An example of a resulting network structure can 25 be found in Figure 5 and the degree distribution of the endogenously formed networks in 1, 000 is shown in Figure 6 . The degree distribution of the endogenously formed networks is clearly bimodal. One peak corresponds to the uninformed nodes with small degree while the second peak corresponds to the informed nodes with high degree. Figure 7 shows the distribution of the nal action for the 1, 000 simulations conducted. A clear improvement over the Erdös-Rényi networks can be seen, highlighting the importance of core banks with more precise private signals. Since core banks are highly interconnected, there is a higher chance that they are in the neighborhood of a peripheral bank (as opposed to a peripheral bank being in the neighborhood of another peripheral bank) which increases the precision of peripheral banks' social belief.
To further understand the dierence between endogenously formed and random networks, we analyze the time it takes learning to converge. We assume the learning has converged at time t if:
It can be seen from Figure (8 ) that, except for very long convergence times, the system always converges faster in the endogenous network case than in the Erdös-Rényi case. Note, that this simulation was conducted without initialization bias, i.e. with average initial action of 1 2 . Finally, the probability of contagion as a function of an initialization bias, i.e. as a function of average initial action is shown in Figure (9) . Again, the picture is unanimously showing that the probability of contagion, i.e. the probability that more than 80% of agents coordinate on a state non-matching action is signicantly smaller in the endogenous network case than in the case of a random Erdös-Rényi graph.
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Conclusion
This paper develops a model of contagious synchronization of bank's investment strategies. Banks are connected via mutual lines of credit and endogenously choose an optimal network structure. They receive a private signal about the state of the world and observe the strategies of their counterparties. When banks observe the actions of more peers they put more weight on their social belief. We compare three scenarios of weighting functions. First, in the equal weighting scenario, agents place equal weights on their private and social belief. Second, in the neighborhood scenario agents place proportionately more weight on the social signal when the size of the neighborhood increases. Third, in the relative neighborhood scenario agents place more weight on the social belief if their neighborhood constitutes a larger fraction of the overall network. Social learning increases the probability of choosing a state matching action and thus agents' utility.
When agents strategically choose their neighbors they take the additional utility from learning into account. The more neighbors a given agent has, the lower is the marginal utility from another link and the network endogenously reaches an equilibrium conguration.
We obtain two results which are policy relevant. First, in a complexnancial system where agents cannot take the action of all their peers into account when taking an investment decision, the probability of contagious synchronization depends on two things: (i) the weighting between the private and social belief; and (ii) the density of the nancial network. Our model thus relates two empirically relevant sources of systemic risk: common shocks interbank market freezes. Second, the probability of contagious synchronization is substantially reduced when agents internalize the positive eects of social learning in a strategic decision with whom to form a link. The benet from learning is reduced when the private signals about the state of the world are less informative.
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The model has a number of interesting extensions. One example is the case with two dierent regions that can feature diering states of the world.
Such an application could capture a situation in which banks in two countries (one in a boom, the other in a bust) can engage in interbank lending within the country and across borders. This would provide an interesting model for the current situation within the Eurozone. The model so far features social learning but not individual learning. Another possible extension would be to introduce individual learning and characterize the conditions under which the contagious regime exists. Finally, the model can be applied to real-world interbank network and balance sheet data to test for the interplay of contagious synchronization and endogenous network structure.
One drawback of the model is that there is no closed-form analytical solution for the benet a bank obtains through learning from a peer that takes into account higher order eects. This benet will depend on whether or not a neighboring bank chose a state matching on state non-macthing action in the previous period and thus on the social belief of neighboring banks. In the former case, the benet will be positive, while in the latter case it will be Average signal for θ = 0 for informed agents 0.3 µ 1I
Average signal for θ = 1 for informed agents 0.7 σ 0I
Standard deviation of signal for θ = 0 for informed agents
Standard deviation of signal for θ = 1 for informed agents
Average signal for θ = 0 for uninformed agents 0.4 µ 1U
Average signal for θ = 1 for uninformed agents 0.7 σ 0U
Standard deviation of signal for θ = 0 for uninformed agents
Standard deviation of signal for θ = 1 for uninformed agents 
The distribution of the private belief can be computed as follows:
where the probability density function for signal s is given as:
and the private belief p i (s) is given by Equation (8 Pr(
where we use the notation f p (p i | θ = 0) to indicate that the functional form of f p has be derived assuming that θ = 0. This result generalizes to all θ due to the symmetry of the signal structure. It can be shown that:
Pr(x i = θ | q i = q) = 1−q 0 f p (p i | θ = 0)dp i = 1 1−q f p (p i | θ = 1)dp i .
Therefore we have derived an expression for the probability of choosing the correct action that does not depend on the actual state of the world but only on the signal structure and the social belief.
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